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TAX EXEMP110NS FOR RACIALLY 
DISCRIMINATORY PRIVATE SCHOOLS: A 
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 
NEAL DEVINS* 
In Revenue Ruling 71-447, the Internal Revenue Service expressly denied 
tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools. The Reagan 
administration recently challenged the existence of a defined policy pro-
hibiting tax exemptions to these schools as well as the propriety of the 
IRS's involvement in regulating social policy. President Reagan has called 
upon Congress to settle the issue by enacting affirmative legislation. Con-
gress, however, has maintained that long-established federal policy sup-
ports Revenue Ruling 71-447 and has refused to enact affirmative legis-
lation. 
In this Article, Mr. Devins examines the conflict between the executive, 
judicial, and legislative branches of government and argues that Congress 
must rationalize the present system by incorporating federal antidiscri-
mination policy and judicially defined constitutional guarantees into a 
coherent statute. 
On January 8, 1982, the United States Treasury Department 
announced that "without further guidance from Congress, the 
Internal Revenue Service will no longer revoke or deny tax-
exempt status for religious, charitable, educational, or scientific 
organizations on the grounds that they don't conform with fun-
damental public policies. " 1 This policy shift by the Reagan ad-
ministration reversed the established position of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) that tax exemptions should be withheld 
from racially discriminatory private schools.2 The administra-
tion argued that Congress should provide the IRS with explicit 
* Research Associate, Institute for Public Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University; 
B.A., Georgetown University, 1978; J.D., Vanderbilt Law School, 1982. 
The author would like to thank Jeffrey Schoenblum, Chester E. Finn, Jr., and Madison 
Towers for reading an initial draft of this Article; and Donald Hall, Joseph Harrison, 
and Robert Morgan for their editorial suggestions. 
1 I.R.S. News Release (Jan. 8, 1982); 2 CCH Tax Exempt Organizations ~ 6578, at 
9127. 
2 Congress had previously considered enacting legislation on this matter in the summer 
of 1979. See, e.g., S. 103, S. 449, S. 990, S. 995, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. 
16,432-44 (1979). See generally Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
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statutory guidance concerning the implementation of a nondis-
crimination requirement and the denial of tax-exempt status to 
discriminatory schools.3 
Thus far, Congress has refused the invitation to enact such 
new legislation, as it believes that a nondiscrimination require-
ment already is contained in existing statutes and court rulings.4 
Courts have been similarly hesitant about the administration's 
position. In Wright v. Regan,5 the District Court of the District 
of Columbia questioned the legitimacy of the Presidenfs action 
by issuing an injunction prohibiting the IRS from granting tax 
exemptions to racially discriminatory schools. 6 The present law 
reflects the absence of a coherent policy amoqg the three 
branches of government. 
Because the survival of many private schools depends on their 
tax-exempt status, any congressional action would have wide-
spread effects.7 Such legislative action also would reveal how 
the federal government perceives its role in regulating discrim-
inatory private schools.8 
This Article proposes that Congress should enact specific 
legislation dealing with the problem of racial bias in private 
education. Such legislation would reduce the current confusion 
over the existence of a racial nondiscrimination requirement. It 
also would resolve conflicts in the implementation of this non-
discrimination policy among the legislative, executive, and ju-
dicial branches. Under the legislation proposed by this Article, 
3 See Speech by President Ronald Reagan to Cabinet (Jan. 18, 1982); see also Letter 
from President Ronald Reagan to Vice President George Bush (Jan. 18, 1982), reprinted 
in 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 37 (Jan. 25, 1982). 
4 128 CoNG. REc. SI08 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Hart); 128 CoNa. 
Rec. Sill (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Bradley); cf. infra notes 59-67 and 
accompanying text. 
5 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), petition for cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Nov, 
23, 1981) (No. 81-97). 
6 The injunction is effective until the final resolution of the case. Wright v. Regan, 
No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982) (order granting injunction). 
7 Congressional action or inaction will have a significant impact on private education 
generally. See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying text. 
8 The media have focused closely on the recent case of Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 
102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) as indicative of the federal government's attitude in this area. See, 
e.g., U.S. Shifts on School Exemption, Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1982, at 1, col. 4.; Race 
Bias Won't Bar Tax-Exempt Status for Private, Religious Schools, U.S. Says, Wall St. 
J., Jan. 11, 1982, at 1, col. 1; U.S. Drops Rule on Tax Penalty for Racial Bias, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at AI, col. 2. 
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the courts would apply and the IRS would implement the general 
nondiscrimination requirement enacted by Congress. 
I. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS BEFORE 
THE REAGAN POLICY SHIFT 
A. The Judicial Basis of Nondiscrimination Policy 
The national policy opposing racially discriminatory school 
systems stems from the Supreme Court's landmark decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education. 9 Segregated private educational 
institutions, sometimes with the aid of state subsidies, long have 
been used to circumvent Brown in particular, and the goals of 
racial equality and of equal educational opportunity in general. 10 
"The estimated enrollment in southern private schools organized 
or expanded in response to desegregation increased from 
roughly 25,000 in 1966 to approximately 535,000 by 1972."11 As 
one court observed, "[U]nless this [private segregated school] 
system is destroyed, it will shatter to bits the public school 
system . . . and kill the hope that now exists for equal educa-
tional opportunities for all our citizens, white and black. "12 
Yet before 1970, the federal government generally prohibited 
only direct federal assistance to discriminatory private schools.13 
One exception to this policy was a 1967 IRS ruling that a tax 
"exemption will be denied and contributions will not be de-
ductible if the operation of the school is on a segregated basis 
and its involvement with the state or political subdivision is 
such as to make the operation unconstitutional or a violation of 
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial segregation in public schools a denial of due process 
under the Fifth Amendment). 
10 See, e.g., J. ELY, THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA (1976) (private education 
subsidies used to promote massive resistance to desegregation). Similar action was 
taken in North Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana. See D. NEVIN & R. BILLS, THE 
SCHOOLS THAT FEAR .BUILT (1976); King, Rebuilding the Fallen House--State Tuition 
Grants for Elementary and Secondary Education, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1971). 
11 Comment, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1441 
(1973). 
12 Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F . Supp. 833, 857-58 (E.D. 
La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968). 
13 Direct assistance was prohibited under § 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U .S.C. § 2000d-1. 
156 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 20: 153 
the laws of the United States. "14 This nondiscriminatory policy 
was of limited value, however, because a constitutional violation 
by the state was difficult to prove. 15 
In July 1970, the IRS altered this policy16 after an injunction, 
made permanent in Green v. Connally, that denied tax exemp-
tions to discriminatory schools in Mississippi. 17 The IRS based 
this decision on a finding that it would be improper to grant tax 
exemptions to schools that violate the important public policy 
objectives established in Brown and in the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. 18 This is a specific application of the "frustration of public 
policy" doctrine, whereby the government is prohibited from 
benefiting individuals, institutions, or organizations whose prac-
tices or beliefs are contrary to national policy objectives. 19 The 
Green court mandated that schools seeking tax-exempt status 
adopt a policy of racial nondiscrimination, publish that policy, 
and provide certain information to enable the IRS to determine 
that the schools did not racially discriminate.20 Although the 
decision was limited to Mississippi,21 the court stated that the 
IRS "would be within its authority in including similar require-
ments for all schools of the nation. "22 
14 I.R.S. News Release (Aug. 2, 1967); N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1967, at A24, col. 3. An 
example of impermissible state support would be a discriminatory private school that 
had contracted with the Army to teach the children of Army personnel. 
15 See Brown, State Action Analysis ofT ax Expenditures, 91 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1976) 
(nexus to state action difficult to establish). Recent Supreme Court decisions also suggest 
the difficulty of establishing state action. See, e.g., Rendeii-Baker v. Kohn, 102 S. Ct. 
2764 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
16 See I.R.S. News Release (July 10, 1970); N.Y. Times, July II, 1970, at AI, col. 
8. 
17 Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 
404 U.S. 997 (1971). A permanent injunction was issued in Green v. Connally, 330 
F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd summarily, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). The precedential effect 
of this affirmance is unclear. In Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, the Supreme Court gave it 
little precedential weight. See 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.ll (1974) ("[T]he court's affirmance 
in Green lacks that precedential weight of a case involving a truly adversary contro-
versy."). But see Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463 n.6 (1973) (citing Green with 
approval). Congress recognized Green's possible precedential value when it amended 
the tax-exemption provision of the Internal Revenue Code to prohibit the granting of 
tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private clubs. See infra notes 67-71 and 
accompanying text. 
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000h4 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
19 See Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958). 
20 330 F. Supp. at 1179--80. 
21 Id. at 1176. The order was limited because the injured party in that case was from 
Mississippi and was seeking relief only in that state. 
22 Id. 
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The IRS adopted this recommendation in 1971 by issuing 
Revenue Ruling 71-447, which prohibited the granting of tax 
exemptions to private schools that maintained racially discrim-
inatory policies.23 Private schools seeking tax-exempt status 
were required to publicize their nondiscriminatory policies.24 
The IRS issued Revenue Procedure 72-54 to provide guidelines 
for publishing these policies,25 although no particular method of 
publication was required. 26 
In 1975, the IRS updated its requirements for private schools 
seeking tax-exempt status. Revenue Procedure 75-5027 set forth 
guidelines and mandated record-keeping to determine if a pri-
vate school's policies were racially nondiscriminatory. A school 
was required to "show affirmatively both that it has adopted a 
racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students that is made 
known to the general public and that since the adoption of that 
policy it has operated in a bona fide manner in accordance 
therewith."28 The regulation required tax-exempt institutions: 
(a) to adopt formally nondiscriminatory policies in their charters 
or bylaws, (b) to refer to such policies in their advertising bro-
chures, and (c) to publish annual notice of such policies in a 
local newspaper of general circulation. 29 
Recognizing that religious schools appeal to a discrete seg-
ment of the community, the Procedure allowed these schools to 
satisfy their publication requirement through a notice of nondis-
crimination in a newsletter or magazine of the religious organi-
zation.30 In 1975, the IRS also published a revenue ruling deny-
ing tax-exempt status to any religious institution that maintained 
racially discriminatory policies, even if that discrimination were 
based on sincere religious beliefs.31 Current IRS policies are 
based on these two 1975 rulings. 
23 Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. 
24 Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. § 3.01, 1972-2 C.B. 834. For example, "publication by a school of notice of its 
racially nondiscriminatory policy in a newspaper of general circulation serving all racial 
segments of the locality from which the school's student body is drawn." I d. 
27 Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. 
28 Id. § 2.02, 1975-2 C.B. 587. 
29 /d. § 2.02, 1975-2 C.B. 587. 
30 Id. § 4.03, 1975-2 C.B. 588. 
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B. The Proposed 1978 Regulations 
In July 1976, two lawsuits were brought that questioned the 
adequacy of the 1975 enforcement procedures. First, in Green 
v. Miller32 the plaintiff sought enforcement of the permanent 
injunction issued in Green v. Connally. Second, a nationwide 
class action, Wright v. Regan,33 was brought to implement more 
stringent enforceme11t procedures throughout the country. 
These lawsuits, in addition to a concern that some private 
schools adjudicated discriminatory by a court or by an admin-
istrative body were deemed nondiscriminatory under the 1975 
guidelines,34 prompted the IRS to review and ultimately to revise 
its procedures. 
On August 21, 1978, the IRS published a new proposed Rev-
enue Procedure.35 Under this Procedure, a private school was 
considered discriminatory either if it had been held by a court 
or an agency to be racially discriminatory or if it had an insig-
nificant number of minority students and was formed or was 
substantially expanded at or about the time that the public 
schools in the community were desegregated.36 
These standards were in many respects similar to the consti-
tutional standards approved by the Supreme Court in Norwood 
v. Harrison. 31 Under the Norwood standards, a private school 
31 Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158. The IRS based this position on the Supreme 
Court's recognition "that a religious basis for an activity will not serve to preclude 
governmental interference with the activity if it is otherwise clearly contrary to federal 
public policy." Id. at 159; see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The IRS 
position was upheld by the Fourth Circuit in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 
F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980) (rev'g 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978)), cert. gramed, 454 U.S. 
892 (1981), and in Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 
1981) (aff'g 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977)), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 892 (1981). 
The Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Schools cases recently were argued before 
the Supreme Court. 51 U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1982). 
32 Motion to Enforce Decree and for further Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7, 
Green v. Miller, 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 1566 (D. Colo. 1980). 
33 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979). 
34 See Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 011 
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979) 
(testimony of Jerome Kurtz, Comm'r, IRS) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. 
3s 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978). 
36 Id. at 37,296-97. 
37 413 U.S. 455 (1973). The Court declared unconstitutional a Mississippi textbook 
lending program that provided textbooks to all private schools, including those that 
excluded students on the basis of race. Plaintiffs had alleged that the law was uncon-
stitutional on two grounds. First, the program was viewed as direct state aid to racially 
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may obtain certification of nondiscrimination by providing in-
formation as to its admissions policies and the number of its 
minoiity students. Unlike this informational requirement, how-
ever, the proposed IRS procedure used percentages to define 
what constituted an insignificant minority enrollment. 38 This 
would have established radal quotas for suspect schools. The 
Procedure also did not distinguish: between religious and non-
religious schools, even "if religious schools granted preference 
in admission to students ef their faith. 39 
The IRS received an enormous number of written comments, 
mostly hostile, concerning this Procedure. 40 This firestorm of 
protest led to the scheduling of oversight hearings in both 
Houses of Congress.41 On Feburary 9, 1979, a few days before 
these hearings were to begin, the IRS introduced a milder ver-
sion of the proposed regulations.42 Unlike the IRS's earlier pro-
posal, the revised Procedure permitted the IRS to consider spe-
cial circumstances in granting tax-exempt status, such as the 
formation or expansion of religious schools whose denomina-
tional beliefs did not mandate racial discrimination. 43 The new 
regulations, however, retained a modified version of the numer-
ical "significant minority enrollment" test.44 Public opposition 
to this quota-like standard and congressional fears regarding 
possible IRS control over private education resulted in severe 
criticism of the revised proposal.45 
segregated education. Second, the program was considered to impede the desegregation 
of public educational facilities. The Court based its decision on the first ground. 
38 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296, 37,298 (1978). Suspect schools having a student body whose 
percentage of minority students was less than 20% of the percentage of the minority 
school age population in the community served by the school would have lost their tax-
exempt status unless they could show good-faith efforts to attract available minority 
students. Good faith was defined as satisfaction of four of the following five criteria: (1) 
availability and granting of significant minority scholarships, (2) vigorous minority re-
cruitment, (3) an increased percentage of minority enrollment, (4) employment of mi-
nority teachers or professional staff, and (5) other substantial evidence. 
n See id. at 37,297-98. 
40 See Wilson, An Overview of the I.R.S.'s Revised Proposed Revenue Procedure on 
Private Schools as Tax-Exempt Organizations, 57 TAXES 515 (1979). 
41 See id. 
42 44 Fed. Reg. 9451 (1979). 
43 !d. at 9453. 
"'!d. (exceptions from this standard granted when "circumstances ... limit the 
school's ability to attract minority students"). 
45 See Hearings, supra note 34, at 280-304 (testimony of William B. Ball, counsel for 
Nat'! Comm. for Religious Freedom); id. at 725-29 (testimony of Sen. Hatch); id. at 
971-83 (testimony of Rep. Robert Dornan). 
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C. Congressional Response to the 1978 Proposal 
Congress, satisfied with existing procedures and alarmed by 
the IRS's revised guidelines, stayed the implementation of these 
guidelines by passing riders to the Treasury Appropriations Act 
of 1980.46 The Doman Amendment provided that "none of the 
funds available under [the] Act may be used to carry out [the 
IRS proposals]."47 The Ashbrook Amendment provided more 
generally that no funds may be used "to formulate or carry out 
any rule, policy, procedure, guideline, standard or measure 
which would cause the loss of tax exempt status to private, 
religious, or church-operated schools ... unless in effect prior 
to August 22, 1978."48 These restrictions, which were scheduled 
to lapse on October 1, 1980, have remained in force through 
continuing resolutions passed by Congress.49 
Congress has been satisfied to maintain the status quo through 
these riders; affirmative legislation modifying the tax-exemption 
provision of the Internal Revenue Code has been thought un-
necessary. The House recently revised the Ashbrook Amend-
ment to extend its coverage, thereby precluding the IRS from 
implementing judicial statutory interpretations that require more 
stringent nondiscrimination enforcement measures than the 
standards in effect before August 22, 1978.50 This modification 
resulted from congressional dissatisfaction with the court's hold-
ing in Green v. Miller. 51 The Miller court used a test similar to 
that in Norwood, in holding that a school was presumed to be 
46 Dornan Amendment, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appro· 
priations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 615, 93 Stat. 559,571 (1979); Ashbrook Amendment, 
Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 103, 93 Stat. 559, 562 (1979); see also 125 CONG. REC. Sl1 ,979-
85 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979) (Senate debate); 125 CoNG. REc. Sll,829-54 (daily ed. Sept. 
5, 1979) (same); 125 CoNG. REc. H5979-85 (daily ed. July 16, 1979) (House debate); 
125 CoNG. REc. 18,434 (1979) (same). 
47 Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 615, 93 Stat. 559, 577 (1979). 
48 Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 103, 93 Stat. 559, 562 (1979). 
49 See 127 CoNG. REc. H5398 (daily ed. July 30, 1981); 126 CoNG. REC. H7218 (daily 
ed. Aug. 19, 1980); 125 CONG. REC. H5983 (daily ed. July 16, 1979). 
50 Reported from the House Appropriations Committee on July 9, 1981, H.R. REP. 
No. 171, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.; passed by the House on July 30, 1981, 127 CoNG. REC. 
H5392-98; reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on Sept. 22, 1981, S. REP. 
No. 192, 97th Cong., lst Sess.; and Senate consideration begun, but not completed, on 
Dec. 14, 1981, 127 CONG. REC. S15,177-95 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1981). 
51 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 111566 (D. Colo. 1980); see also 127 CoNG. REc. H5394-95 
(daily ed. July 30, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Dornan); 127 CoNo. REc. H5392-93 (daily 
ed. July 30, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Ashbrook). 
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racially discriminatory if it had been determined to be discrim-
inatory in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or was estab-
lished at a time when public schools in its area were desegre-
gating and could not demonstrate that it did not discriminate. 52 
This standard is similar to the 1978 IRS proposal whose imple-
mentation was stayed by the appropriations riders. 
II. THE TAX-EXEMPTION PROVISION AS A POLICY MEASURE 
A. The Nondiscrimination Requirement: 
Congressional Recognition 
Congress has refused to incorporate an explicit nondiscrimi-
nation requirement into the Internal Revenue Code because it 
believes existing congressional enactments and legislative de-
bates have clearly established that Congress recognizes nondis-
crimination requirements. Civil rights advocates argue that pos-
itive legislation would legitimize President Reagan's position 
that there is presently no nondiscrimination requirement in the 
Code. 53 Congress' belief in the current existence of the nondis-
crimination requirement also is apparent in legislative discussion 
of a concurrent resolution before Congress stating that "current 
Federal law clearly authorizes and requires the Internal Reve-
nue Service to deny tax-exempt status and deductibility of con-
tributions to private schools that discriminate on the basis of 
race."54 A resolution, rather than specific legislation, was intro-
duced because it was felt that "new legislation is both unnec-
essary and confusing. The law and policy against granting tax 
exemptions to such schools is clear."55 Thus, as Senator Moy-
nihan (D-N.Y.) commented, "The administrative decision to 
reverse the established federal rule denying tax-exempt status 
52 Green v. Miller, 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 1566 (D. Colo. 1980). 
53 See Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding tlze Tax-Status of Ra-
cially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearings Before tlze House Comm. on Ways and 
Mea11S, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (statement of Lawrence H. Tribe, professor of law, 
Harvard Law School). 
s.s S. Con. Res. 59, 128 CoNG. REc. SI08 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. 
Hart) (emphasis added); see infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
55 128 CONG. REc. Sill (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Bradley). 
162 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 20:153 
to private schools and colleges that practice racial discrimination 
is . . . illegal. "56 
The clear federal policy against discriminatory institutions is 
firmly established in Supreme Court decisions such as Brown v. 
Board of Education,57 Norwood v. Harrison,58 and Runyon v. 
McCrmy,59 as well as in many congressional enactments, in-
cluding the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act of 
1968, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6° Congress' reaction to 
M cGlotten v. Connally61 illustrates its opposition to granting tax 
exemptions to racially discriminatory institutions. In Mc-
Glotten, the court held that nonprofit private clubs that excluded 
nonwhites from membership were entitled to tax-exempt sta-
tus.62 The court decided that because the tax exemptions were 
income-defining, they should not be conditioned on socially 
acceptable behavior. 
Congress had determined that in a situation where individ-
uals have banded together to provide recreational facilities 
on a mutual basis, it would be conceptually erroneous to 
impose a tax on the organization as a separate entity .... 
[N]o income of the sort usually taxed has been generated; 
the money has simply been shifted from one pocket to an-
other, from within the same pair of pants.63 
Congress expressed its dissatisfaction with McGlotten by 
amending the tax-exemption provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code to prohibit the granting of tax exemptions to racially dis-
criminatory private clubs. 64 Congress thus views the tax-exemp-
tion provision as a matter of broad social policy extending be-
56 Office of Sen. Moynihan (D-N.Y.), News Release (Jan. 9, 1982) (copy on file with 
the author). 
57 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
58 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (state aid to discriminatory private schools prohibited). 
59 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (private schools must admit minority students under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (1976)). 
60 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000h4 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3601 (1976). 
61 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). 
62 Id. at 457-59. The court also held that tax exemptions given to racially discrimi· 
natory fraternal organizations were impermissible under Fifth Amendment Equal Pro· 
tection analysis. Further, provision of a tax deduction for charitable contributions was 
held to be a grant of federal financial assistance within the scope of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
6) 338 F. Supp. at 458. 
64 26 U.S.C. § 50l(c) (1976). 
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yond the definition of income. Congress also has indicated that 
it supports nondiscrimination as a social policy. 65 Finally, 
amending the Code suggests Congress' willingness to act when 
it does not approve of the decisions of the other branches of 
government. In H aig v. Agee, 66 the Supreme Court indicated 
that Congress' failure to change an agency ruling is an implicit 
acceptance of the ruling. By not enacting legislation in response 
to Revenue Ruling 71-447, Congress implied acceptance of its 
principle of nondiscrimination. The Ashbrook and Dornan 
Amendments also implicitly support the legitimacy of an existing 
nondiscrimination requirement by limiting the scope of IRS en-
forcement efforts.67 
B. The Nondiscrimination Requirement: Enforcement Issues 
1. Is a tax exemption government aid? Whether a tax exemp-
tion can be classified as government aid raises issues under both 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids granting federal aid 
to institutions that discriminate on the basis of "race, color or 
national origin,"68 and the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment, which forbids government establishment of reli-
gion and severely limits federal aid to religiously affiliated pri-
vate schools.69 
The district court in McGlotten v. Connally concluded that a 
tax exemption to a racially discriminatory fraternal order is 
federal aid under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.70 This holding 
was based in part on the recognition that other forms of indirect 
assistance have been recognized as federal aid.71 More impor-
tant, the court found that the purpose of the Act "is clearly to 
6.< The Senate Committee Report on this legislation states that "it is believed that it 
is inappropriate for a social club ... to be exempt from income taxation if its written 
policy is to discriminate on account of race, color, or religion." S. REP. No. 1318, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6051, 6058. 
66 101 S. Ct. 2766 0981). 
67 Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 
No. 96-74, §§ 103, 615; see supra notes 49-55; see also Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 
832-35 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussion of Act). 
63 42 U .S.C. §§ 2000, 2000d-1 (1976). 
69 U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no Jaw respecting an establishment of 
religion .•. . ").See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 14-8, 14-
9 (1979). 
7o 338 F. Supp. 448, 461 (D.D.C. 1972). 
11Jd. 
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eliminate discrimination in programs or activities benefiting from 
federal assistance.""72 The decision is sound, although it raises a 
problematic issue concerning the possible "overconstitutionali-
zation" of the Internal Revenue Code, whereby the Code's rev-
enue collecting function is subsumed by social policies derived 
from the Constitution. 73 As an economic matter, a tax exemption 
would have to be entirely income-defining to avoid being char-
acterized as a partial subsidy.74 One report noted: 
[A] tax exemption, no fnatter what its form is essentially a 
government grant or subsidy. Such grants would seem to be 
justified only if the purpose for which they are made is one 
for which the legislative body would be equally willing to 
make a direct appropriation from public funds.75 
The total prohibition of governmental assistance to discrimina-
tory institutions mandates that the Act's coverage should extend 
to the granting of tax exemptions to private schools.76 
The Establishment Clause demands a different analysis of tax 
exemptions. In Walz v. Tax Commission,17 the Supreme Court 
held that a tax exemption is not government aid under the 
Establishment Clause. The majority opinion explained that 
"(t]he grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the 
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches 
but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the 
state."78 The majority's recognition that a religious institution 
benefits through a tax exemption makes this claim appear fa-
cially dubious.79 Establishment Clause analysis, however, fo-
cuses on whether the "primary effect" of the exemption is to 
aid the institution, not whether some benefit might accrue to 
the institution.80 Thus, a tax exemption might be impermissible 
72 /d. 
"See Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: Constitlltionalizing the Internal 
Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972). 
74 See Yale, Income Tax Deductions and Credits for Nonpublic Education: Toll'ard 
a Fair Definition of Net Income, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91 (1979). 
75 BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, REPORT ON A SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATION IN IOWA: 
THE REVENUE SYSTEM 33 (1933). 
76 Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). 
n 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
78 /d. at 675. 
79 Id. at 674-75. 
80 Before 1977, Supreme Court precedents had suggested that almost no form of aid 
from the state either to non public schools or to the families of non public school students 
would be constitutional. This restriction has been relaxed in recent years. Compare 
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1973) (tuition grants and 
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under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but not under the Establish-
ment Clause. Thus, there may be a conflict between the judicial 
branch's prohibition of tax exemptions on constitutional 
grounds and the executive branch's interpretation of legislative 
enactments. 
2. What constitutes discrimination? Determining what con-
stitutes discrimination is analytically complex and emotionally 
charged. Should discriminatory acts be limited to explicit racial 
practices, such as refusing to admit any minority applicants or 
banning interracial dating, or should it include the gender-based 
classification found in an all-male military academy? How 
should explicit discriminatory beliefs be classified? For instance, 
is a Nazi-run school's teaching that blacks are an inferior race 
discriminatory? What if such practices are grounded in religious 
doctrine, such as Biblical passages that are interpreted to sug-
gest that members of each race should associate only with mem-
bers of the same race? Finally, what view should be taken of a 
school that is racially imbalanced due to factors unrelated to 
racial practices or beliefs? For instance, how should a private 
school whose classes are taught in German, Chinese, Hebrew, 
or Swahili be treated? Additional factors, such as location, idio-
syncratic curricula and procedures, and admissions criteria 
based on religion, national origin, or measures of achievement 
may lead to racially imbalanced schools. 
Unless the statutory criteria for nondiscrimination are clear, 
a private school will have to make difficult choices concerning 
its tax-exempt status.81 For example, must a school for Ortho-
dox Jews offer scholarships for nonwhite Orthodox Jews? For 
white non-Jews? Must it merely promote the fact that minority 
Orthodox Jews are welcome to seek admission, or must the 
school admit any minority student even though this may hinder 
the school's ability to provide a particular type of religious 
environment for the education of its students? If such a school 
need not abide by these requirements, however, what is to be 
deductions and maintenence reimbursements declared unconstitutional), and Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369-72 (1975) (broad range of direct and indirect aid declared 
unconstitutional), with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1977) (funding upheld 
for theraputic and diagnostic tests but prohibited for field trips and instructional mate-
rials), and Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658-61 (1980) (direct 
reimbursement to private schools for state mandated testing upheld). 
81 See Hearings, supra note 34, at 288-89 (testimony of William B. Ball). 
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done with a religious school whose practices are governed by 
the Ku Klux Klan? A solution to the tax-exemption dilemma 
that does not recognize the onerous practical effect it may have 
outside the scope of the original problem only will exacerbate 
matters. 
A finding of discrimination by a court, as a constitutional 
matter, requires a showing of discriminatory intent. The Su-
preme Court stated in Washington v. Davis82 that its "cases 
have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official 
act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discrimina-
tory purpose, is unconstitutional, solely because it has a racially 
disproportionate impact. "83 Discriminatory intent does not mean 
that discrimination was merely a motive, but that it was the 
predominant motive. 84 In the case of private schools receiving 
state assistance, the test of constitutionality is the Norwood 
standard. 85 Under existing IRS procedures, a school that is 
found to be discriminatory and thus is prohibited from receiving 
state aid under the Norwood standard would be entitled to a tax 
exemption if it met the three guidelines outlined in Revenue 
Procedure 75-50.86 The classification of a tax exemption as gov-
ernment aid for purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, how-
ever, would result in the incorporation into the Internal Revenue 
Code of standards similar to the Norwood constitutional 
standards. 
Congress can enact a statutory nondiscrimination standard 
that is more stringent than existing constitutional standards,87 
as demonstrated by recent congressional action in strengthening 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.88 There, Congress was concerned 
82 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
83 Id. at 239. 
84 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 
n.21 (1977). 
as Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,467 (1973), on remand, 382 F. Supp. 921, 925 
(N.D. Miss. 1974) ("[T]he critical time of a private school's formation or unusual 
enlargement must be a significant factor .. . in determining whether it is racially dis-
criminatory."). 
26 See Hearings, supra note 34, at 1-S (testimony of Jerome Kurtz, Comm'r, IRS); 
see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
81 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966) (Congress may prohibit usc 
of certain literacy tests for voter eligibility, even if use of tests does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
88 See Blumstein, Minority Civil Rights and Voting Rights, Wall St. J., May 27, 1982, 
at 28, col. 3. 
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with the difficulty and the enormous expense of proving subjec-
tive discriminatory intent. 89 Similar problems exist in determin-
ing whether a private school has discriminated. Countervailing 
education and tax policies, however, must be considered in this 
determination. 
C. The Nondiscrimination Requirement: Policy Issues 
1. Aid to Private Schools. There are a variety of policy ar-
guments that justify government assistance to private education. 
In expressing support for certain forms of state aid to religiously 
affiliated schools, Justice Powell asserted that: 
Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, 
have provided an educational alternative for millions of 
young Americans; they often afford wholesome competition 
with our public schools; and in some states, they relieve the 
tax-burden incident to the operation of public schools. The 
state has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating ed-
ucation of the highest quality for all children within its 
boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen for 
them.90 
Private schools also may be a desirable educational alternative 
because they are free of many of the governmental constraints 
on public schools. Private schools can impart values, teach 
religion, enforce different disciplinary standards, select and dis-
miss teachers, and insist on sustained academic achievement in 
ways that public schools cannot. This is the essence of their 
privateness and of their appeal. 
Tax exemptions are critical to the financial survival of private 
schools. Twenty-three percent of the revenues of private 
schools result from their tax-exempt status or the related char-
itable deduction.91 Tax-exempt status is also an essential symbol 
of their continued independence from government control.92 Pri-
69 128 CoNG. REc. S6560-61 (daily ed. June 9, 1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 
cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 303, 327-28 (1965) (concern over obstruc-
tionist lawsuits at time of original passage of Voting Rights Act led Congress to prescribe 
remedies without prior adjudication of voting discrimination). 
90 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
91 See Hearings, supra note 34, at 400 (testimony of John Esty, Jr., President, Nat'l 
Ass'n of Indep. Schools). 
92 See Finn, Public Support for Private Education, Pt. 1, AM. Enuc., May 1982, at 
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vate schools strongly oppose any quota-based nondiscrimination 
standard that would condition a school's tax-exempt status on 
its minority enrollment, because such a standard infringes on 
their freedom to control their educational curricula.93 
Civil rights groups view the issue differently. For them, 
"[ w ]hat is at stake is not some finely crafted provision of the 
tax code but the principles of Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, Kansas."94 The civil rights groups' position is that the 
government's primary duty is to ensure that tax exemptions are 
not given to schools with discriminatory practices. They argue 
that the IRS should evaluate a private school's nondiscrimina-
tion policy by looking at the actual number of minority students 
enrolled in it.95 Some civil rights proponents also advocate non-
discrimination standards similar to the IRS's August 1978 
proposal. 96 
The civil rights groups insist that IRS standards that strictly 
enforce the nondiscrimination requirements97 are justified by (1) 
the rise of all-white "segregation academies" in Southern school 
4. It should be noted, however, that a schism exists within private education. On the 
one hand, older mainstream schools are willing to accept government regulation as a 
cost of obtaining needed government aid. These schools view themselves as quasi-
public institutions, linked in many ways with government. See Finn & Devins, Reagan, 
Discrimination and Private Schools, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1982, at 30, col. 3. On the 
other hand, fundamentalist schools, which represent the fastest growing sector of private 
education, are unwilling to have themselves linked with government. Leaders of these 
groups argue that government should not interfere with their religious liberty by regu-
lating their schools. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 554-56 (testimony of Paul Kiene!, 
Executive Director, Ass'n of Christian Schools Jnt'l). The fundamentalists view their 
schools as islands of religious freedom. For them, a tax exemption is not government 
aid. Rather, it is merely the absence of government involvement in properly private 
matters. See Finn, supra, at 7. 
93 See Hearings, supra note 34, at 1158-67 (testimony of Robert L. Lamborn, Exec-
utive Director, Council for Am. Private Educ.). 
94 See Hearings, supra note 34, at 1229 (statement of Charles A. Lane, Co-Chairman, 
Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law). 
95 See Hearings, supra·note 34, at 470 (statement of Bill Lann Lee, Assistant Counsel, 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund). He stated: 
I d. 
The experience in Mississippi indicates that subjective and unverified profes-
sions of good faith and nondiscrimination are not enough in the situation where, 
as here, an all white private school has been established or significantly ex-
panded in the wake of a local public school desegregation order as an escape 
for those seeking to escape the desegregation order. 
96 See infra note 35; see also Hearings, supra note 34, at 1229-32 (statement of Charles 
A. Lane); id. at 472-84 (testimony of E. Richard Larson, Nat'] Staff Counsel, Am. Civil 
Liberties Union). 
97 See also Hearings, supra note 34, at 730 (testimony of ArthurS. Flemming, Chair-
man, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights). 
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districts that have been subject to desegregation orders, (2) the 
increase in the number of direct government aid programs that 
could benefit these schools, and (3) the national policy of pre-
venting discriminatory actions. According to these groups, tax 
exemptions are not entitlements, which can be taken away only 
if schools are blatantly discriminatory, but rather, are benefits 
that should be given only to those private schools that demon-
strate compliance with the government's goal of non-
discrimination. 
Adopting the approach of the civil rights groups would limit 
the diversity in thought and methodology that is essential to 
private education. This approach also would encourage in-
creased use of the tax system as a tool of social regulation in 
the absence of specific congressional mandate. Weak enforce-
ment standards, however, would lead to the equally undesirable 
outcome of tacitly approving racially discriminatory practices. 
2. Tax Policy Issues. Whether a tax exemption is analogous 
to a social welfare program has been perennially debated by tax 
policy experts. Boris Bittker and George Radhert have argued 
that a tax exemption is different from other forms of government 
largesse. They contend that: 
Congress has rested income tax exemption on a number of 
distinct rationales [including] a lack of fit between the con-
cept of "income" and the objectives of nonprofit organiza-
tions; their meager potential as a source of revenue; the 
nuisance of record keeping for groups that often operate 
informally and rely heavily on voluntary services; and the 
praiseworthy benevolent spirit animating such groups.98 
The response to this argument is that Cong(ess' amendment of 
the tax exemption provision after McGlotten v. Connally 
strongly suggests that Congress regards the social welfare func-
tion of groups receiving tax exemptions to be very important.99 
Thus, organizations seeking tax exemptions should be required 
to remain within broad social parameters established by the 
nation's public policies. 
The value of tax-exempt organizations, however, stems not 
only from their actions, but also from the important national 
98 Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income 
Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 304 (1976). 
99 See supra notes 67-71. 
.. 
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value of pluralism. 100 Support for diversity of thought has been 
strong throughout American history. This suggests that the gov-
ernment should not promote one type of behavior or ideology 
over another through largesse. IOI 
An additional argument against using tax exemptions as a tool 
of social policy is that the primary function of the tax system is 
the generation of revenues, not the regulation of social behavior. 
Although tax exemptions do encourage some activities and dis-
courage others, 102 modifying the tax-exemption provision of the 
Internal Revenue Code to require affirmative action on the part 
of private schools would improperly transform that provision 
into a mandate for a particular form of socially desirable behav-
ior. Thus, pluralism and revenue generation are considerations 
that limit the use of tax-exemption regulations to mere identifi-
cation of discriminatory practices, not enforcement of affirma-
tive action programs. 
III. A POLICY PROPOSAL 
The nondiscrimination requirement that now governs the 
granting of tax exemptions to discriminatory schools should be 
based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The IRS, unless required 
to do otherwise by Congress or the courts, should develop 
procedures with the sole purpose of ensuring that tax-exempt 
schools operate in a nondiscriminatory manner. Norwood's con-
stitutional standards should guide the IRS in developing these 
enforcement procedures. 
Congress, however, also should avoid enacting an overly 
broad, "effects-only" definition of discrimination. Such an en-
actment would undercut pluralism interests in favor of affirma-
tive nondiscrimination requirements. Schools that have not dis-
criminated should be entitled to receive tax exemptions. A 
private school, however, should be required to submit detailed 
information about its operations in order to give the fact-
100 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
101 See Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishmellt Clause, 
67 CALIF. L. REV. I 104 (1979). 
102 Critics of the current tax structure argue that government benefits should take the 
form of direct government aid. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 705 (1970). 
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finder sufficient information to determine whether the school 
discriminates. 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for Congress actively 
to oversee IRS implementation of such a policy. Lawmakers 
have different views of discriminatory school practices and of 
appropriate IRS enforcement procedures. Personal value con-
flicts might prevent Congress from distinguishing among dis-
criminatory practices, beliefs, and effects. 
Congress can adopt, however, a general nondiscrimination 
requirement that incorporates past court decisions and recog-
nizes the applicability of constitutional standards. The courts 
then will be able to answer the difficult questions regarding the 
scope of the nondiscrimination requirement on a case-by-case 
basis through private party challenges to determinations of tax 
exemption status. The judicial decisions will give the IRS ex-
plicit direction for enforcement of the nondiscrimination require-
ment. If Congress is dissatisfied with the court's statutory in-
terpretations, it can-as it did in the case of racially 
discriminatory private clubs-enact correcting legislation. 
The current conflict among the three branches of government 
regarding the presence of a general nondiscrimination require-
ment should be eliminated. A more beneficial approach would 
be the development of an implicit working relationship among 
the branches through the adoption of a general nondiscrimina-
tion requirement enacted by Congress, defined by the courts, 
and implemented by the IRS. 
IV. PoTENTIAL BARRIERS TO SuccESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION 
OF A GENERAL NONDISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT 
A. Judicial Barriers: Standing to Sue 
The ability of private parties to challenge the sufficiency of 
IRS enforcement procedures is the subject of Wright v. Re-
gan.103 The narrow issue before the Supreme Court in Wright is 
whether a general "denigration of the race" claim is a sufficient 
basis for standing to sue. If such a claim does not suffice, a 
103 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), petition for cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Dec. 
8, 1981) (No. 81-970). 
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private party might have to show either that he has been treated 
in a discriminatory manner by the school or that the school's 
discriminatory practices have impeded area-wide desegregation 
efforts.104 These standards are unsatisfactory to those who seek 
strict enforcement of the IRS nondiscrimination requirement. 105 
First, if the claim is based on injury to a particular student, the 
remedy will be limited to the school's treatment of that student 
alone. 106 Second, proving harm from area-wide desegregation in 
a given community might be very difficult.1D7 
In one of its most recent standing pronouncements, Valley 
Forge Christian College v. Americans/or Separation of Church 
& State, 108 the Supreme Court held that an allegation of psy-
chological harm is an insufficient basis on which to bring a 
claim.109 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated: 
[There is no place in our constitutional scheme for] the 
philosophy that the business of the federal courts is correct-
ing constitutional errors and that "cases and controversies" 
are at best merely convenient vehicles for doing so and at 
worst nuisances that may be dispensed with when they be-
come obstacles to the transcendent endeavor. 110 
Similarly, the government alleges in Wright that the fact that a 
private party "may share certain attributes common to persons 
who may have suffered discrimination at the hands of private 
schools, is an insufficent ground upon which to conclude that 
they have been injured in fact. " 111 The counterargument is that 
the government has an absolute duty to avoid aiding racially 
discriminatory institutions and thus plaintiffs' alleged injury is 
of a suffieiently personal nature to justify a hearing on the 
merits. 112 
Congress should anticipate that standing may be denied to 
IM See Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Wright v. 
Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. 
Dec. 8, 1981) (No. 81-970). 
105 See Wright, 656 F.2d at 825 (summary of plaintiffs' complaint in Green v. Connally, 
330 F. Supp. 1150, aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971)). 
106 /d. at 827. 
107 See Devins, Tax Exempt School Issue Alive, Nat'! L.J., Mar. 29, 1982, at 15. 
1os 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). 
109 /d. 
110 /d. at 767. 
111 Petition for Certiorari at 15, Wright, 50 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1981) (No. 
81-970). 
112 Memorandum Opposing Certiorari filed by Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law at 9, Wright, 50 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1981) (No. 81-970). 
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individuals seeking relief from generalized discriminatory prac-
tices and respond to this possibility by incorporating a "right to 
sue" provision as a part of the amended tax-exemption statute. 
Admittedly, a provision that confers standing does not obviate 
the requirement that "plaintiff still must allege a distinct and 
palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a 
large class of other possible litigants."113 Such a provision, how-
ever, might affect the courts' perception of what constitutes "a 
distinct and palpable injury." In his concurrence in Trafficante 
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 114 Justice White wrote: 
[A]bsent the Civil Rights Act of 1968, I would have great 
difficulty in concluding that petitioner's complaint in this 
case presented a case or controversy within the jurisdiction 
of the District Court under Article III of the Constitution. 
But with that statute purporting to give all those who are 
authorized to complain to the agency the right to sue in 
Court, I would sustain the Statute insofar as it extends stand-
ing to those in the position of the petitioners in this case. 115 
If Congress specifically puts a broad standing provision in the 
statute, courts will have difficulty circumventing their respon-
sibilities through procedural manipulation and will be more 
likely to decide cases on their merits. 
B. Legislative Barriers: Appropriation Restrictions 
Congress may restrict nondiscrimination enforcement efforts 
through the passage of appropriations riders that limit the scope 
of the enforcement standards. The Ashbrook and Dornan 
Amendments, for example, were designed to prevent implemen-
tation of an "affirmative action" nondiscrimination enforcement 
standard.116 Moreover, in the House's revised form, the Ash-
brook Amendment seeks to prohibit the IRS from implementing 
any standards developed by the courts that grant broader relief 
than that provided under existing regulations. 117 This provision 
could result in conflicts among the three branches of government 
113 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 
114 409 u.s. 205 (1972). 
ll$[d. at 212 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Simon v. Eastern 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). 
116 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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since the constitutional standards of Equal Protection defined 
in Norwood118 are more expansive than the existing IRS regu-
lations. Thus, the constitutional decisions of the courts may 
conflict directly with the congressional appropriations riders. 
The ultimate resolution of these congressional actions might 
lead to the very unsatisfactory result of withdrawal of tax ex-
emptions from all private schools. If the IRS obeyed a court 
qrder that went beyond existing regulations, it would violate the 
House's revised Ashbrook Amendment prohibitions. If the IRS 
refused to obey the court order, it could be held in contempt of 
court and enjoined from granting any tax exemptions. Congress 
then might be forced to try to enact specific legislation in order 
to nullify the effect of the court's statutory interpretation. If its 
past actions provide any indication, Congress may be incapable 
of satisfactorily enacting such specific legislation.119 Rather, 
Congress must establish broad parameters which permit the 
courts to define and the IRS to implement the nondiscrimination 
requirements. 
Such general legislation should incorporate the Norwood con-
stitutional standards into existing enforcement procedures. Con-
gress also should appropriate sufficient funds to the IRS to 
implement this standard. Without these funds, the enactment of 
a nondiscrimination requirement would do little more than trig-
ger conflicts among the three branches of government, because 
the IRS would be financially unable to follow judicial interpre-
tations requiring more stringent enforcement procedures. 
C. Executive Barriers: Narrow Statut01y Interpretation 
The Executive Branch also can limit the reach of nondiscri-
mination enforcement standards. Although constitutionally 
118 413 U.S. 455 (1973). These problems were hinted at in a pleading filed by the 
Justice Department in the Wright litigation: 
[The contentions may raise] serious constitutional questions, such as whether 
it is constitutionally proper for the Federal Government to confer tax exempt 
status on private schools that discriminate on the basis of race. Furthermore, 
insofar as the prohibitions may bar defendants from exercising enforcement 
discretion or from enforcing fully Code Section 50l(c)(3)'s nondiscrimination 
requirement, they may intrude upon the president's duty under Article II of 
the United States Constitution to see that the Jaws are faithfully carried out. 
Response of Defendants to Second Supplemental Memorandum of Intervenor Wayne 
Allen in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 8-9, Wright, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979). 
119 But see McGiotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). 
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mandated to faithfully execute the law, 120 the Executive has 
considerable latitude in interpreting congressional enactments. 
For example, the Carter and the Reagan administrations adopted 
conflicting statutory interpretations of the tax-exemption pro-
vision. President Reagan based his decision to grant tax exemp-
tions to racially discriminatory private schools on the fact that 
Congress had not explicitly required otherwise. 121 The Execu-
tive Branch also could narrow judicial decisions interpreting tax-
exemption statutes by implementing court decrees only in those 
areas covered by the court order.122 To avoid such problems, 
Congress should incorporate a requirement into its legislation 
that the IRS must implement the nondiscrimination standard in 
accordance with specified judicial decisions such as Norwood. 
V. CONCLUSION: ELEMENTS OF PROPER CONGRESSIONAL 
ENACTMENT 
Congress should incorporate the following provisions into 
positive legislation: 
(1) a general nondiscrimination requirement that incorporates 
existing IRS rulings and procedures along with the constitu-
tional standards that have been determined by the courts; 
(2) a right to sue that encourages court rulemaking through 
private-party actions; and 
(3) provision of sufficient funds to the IRS to implement this 
policy. 
Congress also must provide statutory guidance. Otherwise, 
the current confusion concerning both the existence and the 
expansiveness of the nondiscrimination requirement will re-
main. This is due to a fundamental disagreement within the 
Congress and among different Presidents over what constitutes 
discrimination and whether a tax exemption is government aid. 
Only the judiciar-y can provide consistent guidance on this mat-
ter. The judiciary, through case-by-case adjudication, can be 
cognizant of differences among private schools subject to re-
view. The proposed statute would provide needed stability to 
this highly emotional, erratic area of the law through the formal 
1zo U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 1. 
1Z1 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
I:U See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
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incorporation of past revenue rulings and procedures. The fol-
lowing legislative proposal incorporates these procedures. 
APPENDIX 
A BILL 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to prohibit the 
granting of tax-exempt status to organizations maintaining 
schools with racially discriminatory policies. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. Denial of Tax Exemptions to Organizations Main-
taining Schools with Racially Discriminatory Policies. 
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to 
exemption from tax) is amended by redesignating subsection G) 
as subsection (k) and inserting a new subsection (j) reading as 
follows: 
G) Organizations Maintaining Schools with Racially Dis-
criminatory Policies 
(1) (A) An organization that maintains a regular faculty 
and curriculum and has a regularly enrolled body 
of students in attendance at the place where its 
educational activities are regularly carried on shall 
not be deemed to be described in subsection (c)(3), 
and shall not be exempt from tax under subsection 
(a), if such organization has a racially discrimi-
natory policy. 
(B) Any person may commence a civil suit on his own 
behalf or on behalf of a class of individuals simi-
larly situated against the Internal Revenue Service 
to compel performance of this statute. 
(2) For the purposes of this subsection an organization 
has a 'racially discriminatory policy' if it 
(A) has been adjudicated as racially discriminatory by 
a federal or state court or administrative agency; 
or 
(B) has been either formed or substantially expanded 
at or about the time of a local desegregation order 
and (i) lacks significant minority enrollment and 
(ii) the formation or expansion may be attributed 
in whole or in part to the public school desegre-
gation order; or 
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(C) fails to comport with any of the following require-
ments: (i) it must include a statement in its charter 
bylaws or other governing instrument, or in a res-
olution of its governing body, that it has a racially 
nondiscriminatory policy as to students and ap-
plicants, and (ii) it must include a statement of its 
racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students in 
all of its brochures and catalogs dealing with stu-
dent admissions, programs, and scholarships, and 
(iii) it must make its racially nondiscriminatory 
policy known to all segments of the general com-
munity served by the school by announcing its 
policy of nondiscrimination through some medium 
that reaches the general community served by the 
school, and (iv) it must be able to show that all of 
its programs and facilities are operated in a ra-
cially nondiscriminatory manner. 
(3) The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service 
shall have authority to promulgate regulations de-
signed to enforce this provision. 
CoMMENTS 
177 
The purpose of this Act is to reaffirm the nation's commitment 
to nondiscrimination by prohibiting explicitly the granting of tax 
exemptions to private schools that discriminate on the basis of 
race. Standards are to be established by incorporating existing 
IRS rulings and procedures and constitutional nondiscrimination 
standards into the Internal Revenue Code. 
In the ~ase of religiously affiliated schools, these standards 
comport with any final judicial determination holding such stan-
dards to be unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment. 
Nondiscrimination enforcement techniques will be enhanced 
through enactment of a statutory right to sue, which permits 
enforcement of this provision by third parties. 
Tax exemptions historically have served as a mechanism for 
government encouragement of both specific not-for-profit activ-
ities and national pluralism. However, the government's central 
and overriding commitment to nondiscrimination prohibits any 
government support of institutions that racially discriminate. 
The IRS should enforce this requirement through the least re-
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strictive means available to implement this policy in order to 
maximize diversity of ideas. 
The nondiscrimination requirement, although manifest in past 
congressional actions, is formally adopted in this Act. This will 
prevent the IRS from misinterpreting Congress' established 
commitment to racial nondiscrimination in the granting of tax 
exemptions. 
The present procedure requires formal adoption of a racial 
nondiscrimination policy by the school, provision of specified 
related information to the IRS, and publication of the school's 
racial nondiscrimination policy in an area newspaper. Religious 
schools may satisfy their publication responsibilities through a 
religiously affiliated magazine. These standards originated with 
the IRS, not Congress. The new procedure will formally incorM 
porate these requirements into the taxMexemption provision of 
the Internal Revenue Code to ensure that they are neither 
greatly expanded nor greatly contracted. 
Present procedures are insufficient, as a private school adjuM 
dicated as racially discriminatory may retain its taxMexempt staM 
tus if it qualifies under current IRS rulings. Under the newly 
enacted provisions, the constitutional standards that govern the 
grants of government aid to private schools will be applicable 
to the governmental granting of tax exemptions to private 
schools. 
Adequate enforcement of the racial nondiscrimination reM 
q:uirement demands more than a set of established procedures. 
It requires proper execution of these standards. Private parties 
dissatisfied with the IRS's decision concerning the taxMexempt 
status of a particular institution should be permitted to obtain 
relief in the courts. Congressional enactment of a statutory right 
to sue will provide such recourse. 
